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Non-Technical Summary
New firms are regarded to be of substantial importance for the development of
an economy, especially for innovation, growth, and the creation of jobs. However,
new firms also face a high risk of failure. Thus, there seem to be high try-out
costs connected with the establishment of firms. In order to reduce these try-out
costs, policy makers aim at providing general conditions which ensure a higher
longevity of young firms.
This paper focusses on the number and the composition of the persons involved
in young firms as drivers for the probability of firm survival. As theoretical basis,
the O-ring theory is used. This theory assumes that ability is positively and team
size is negatively related to firm survival. Moreover, it can be inferred from this
theory that a higher level of homogeneity with respect to ability and a higher
level of heterogeneity with respect to the field of education leads to higher survival
chances of new firms.
Using a rich employer-employee data set on the whole population of Danish firms
founded in 1998, I find that the average level of ability in a team and the team
size have positive effects on a firms’ probability to survive the next year. Most
important is founding in a team at all. In contrast, the homogeneity with respect
to ability and the heterogeneity with respect to educations do not effect the
probability of firm survival. Thus, young firms can be supported by making
sure that several persons are involved and the ability of the persons is as high
as possible. However, it is not important that the team members have different
educations and the same level of ability.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Unternehmensgru¨ndungen werden insbesondere wegen ihres Beitrags zu Inno-
vationen, Wachstum und Schaffung von Arbeitspla¨tzen als bedeutsam fu¨r eine
Volkswirtschaft angesehen. Junge Unternehmen haben jedoch auch eine hohe
Wahrscheinlichkeit zu scheitern. Mit der Gru¨ndung von Unternehmen scheinen
also hohe Kosten des Ausprobierens enthalten zu sein. Ein Ziel der Wirtschafts-
politik ist es daher, diese Kosten des Ausprobierens, ob man am Markt bestehen
kann, zu reduzieren und Rahmenbedingungen zu schaffen, die jungen Unterneh-
men eine la¨ngere Lebensdauer ermo¨glichen.
In diesem Papier wird untersucht, welchen Einfluss die Anzahl und die Zusam-
mensetzung der in jungen Unternehmen involvierten Personen auf die U¨berle-
benswahrscheinlichkeit dieser Unternehmen hat. Als Basis fu¨r die Ableitung von
Hypothesen wird die O-Ring-Theorie verwendet. Diese Theorie nimmt an, dass
die durchschnittliche Fa¨higkeit der Individuen in einem Team die U¨berlebens-
wahrscheinlichkeit eines Unternehmens erho¨ht, wa¨hrend ein zusa¨tzliches Team-
mitglied die U¨berlebenswahrscheinlichkeit senkt. Weiterhin la¨sst sich aus dieser
Theorie ableiten, dass ein ho¨herer Grad an Homogenita¨t in den Fa¨higkeiten der
Teammitglieder und ein ho¨herer Grad an Heterogenita¨t in der fachlichen Ausbil-
dung positiv fu¨r die U¨berlebenswahrscheinlichkeit eines Unternehmens ist.
Fu¨r die Analyse steht ein umfangreicher Datensatz zur Verfu¨gung, der sa¨mtli-
che Unternehmen, die 1998 in Da¨nemark gegru¨ndet wurden, sowie alle in diesen
Unternehmen bescha¨ftigten Individuen umfasst. Die Analysen in diesem Papier
zeigen, dass sowohl das durchschnittliche Fa¨higkeitsniveau in einem Team als
auch die Teamgro¨ße einen positiven Einfluss auf die U¨berlebenswahrscheinlich-
keit haben. Dabei ist es insbesondere wichtig, u¨berhaupt im Team zu gru¨nden.
Der Grad der Homogenita¨t hinsichtlich der Fa¨higkeiten und der Grad der Hete-
rogenita¨t hinsichtlich der fachlichen Ausbildung der Teammitglieder haben hin-
gegen keinen Einfluss auf die U¨berlebenswahrscheinlichkeit. Junge Unternehmen
ko¨nnen also dadurch unterstu¨tzt werden, dass man dafu¨r Sorge tra¨gt, dass meh-
rere Personen an der Gru¨ndung beteiligt sind, und dass die durchschnittliche
Fa¨higkeit dieser Personen so hoch wie mo¨glich ist. Die beteiligten Personen
mu¨ssen aber nicht unbedingt aus unterschiedlichen Fachrichtungen kommen und
dasselbe Fa¨higkeitsniveau haben.
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Abstract
In this paper, I analyse how the survival of new firms is affected by the
average ability level in the founding team, the team size, team members’
homogeneity with respect to ability, and team members’ heterogeneity with
respect to education. As a theoretical basis, I apply the O-ring theory
(Kremer (1993)). Using a rich employer-employee data set on the whole
population of Danish firms founded in 1998, I find that the average ability
level in a team and the team size have positive effects on firm survival.
Having a team at all is the most crucial factor for the probability of survival
of young firms. The degree of homogeneity with respect to ability and the
degree of heterogeneity with respect to educations have no effect on the
survival probability.
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1 Introduction
New firms are regarded to be of substantial importance for the development of
an economy, especially for innovation, growth, and the creation of jobs. However,
new firms also face a high risk of failure. For example, Mata and Portugal (1994)
report that only a good half of the firms in their data set survived the first four
years and Audretsch (1991) notices that only a third is still in operation after ten
years. Thus, there seem to be high try-out costs connected with the establishment
of firms. In order to reduce these try-out costs and to create general conditions
which ensure young firms to be in business for longer periods, it is important
to know what determines the survival of new firms in the first years of their
existence.
As many venture capitalists note, one of the main success factors of young firms
is the management team (see e.g. Gompers and Lerner (2001)). This paper
therefore focusses on the impact of the involved persons on new firms’ survival. In
particular, it is analysed how the average ability level, the team size, the degree
of homogeneity with respect to ability, and the degree of heterogeneity with
respect to education affects firm survival. As theoretical basis, the O-ring theory
introduced by Kremer (1993) and applied to young firms by Fabel (2004a,b) and
Fabel and Weber (2005) is used. To my knowledge, this theory is the only one
which links the size and the composition of teams to firm survival.
The O-ring theory assumes that a project consists of a series of tasks, each of
which must be fulfilled at a certain minimum level of quality for the project to
have success.1 The survival probability of a firm is given by the joint probability
of each team member performing her task at a certain minimum level of quality.
For new firms this seems to be an appropriate description since the whole project
can fail if only one task is not performed carefully. For example, the best idea is
not worth anything if it is not marketed appropriately to potential costumers.
The O-ring setup implies a positive effect of ability and a negative effect of team
size on firm survival. Ability of workers is conceptualized by the probability
to perform an assigned task sufficiently well. Higher ability comes along with
1Its name originate from the accident of the space shuttle Challenger which exploded in
1986 because of the malfunctioning of only one of its components: the O-rings of the booster.
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lower individual failure rates which increases the survival chances of the firm. On
the other hand, since tasks are tied to persons, taking on a further person is a
further source of risk since another link in the chain of necessary tasks has to be
completed. Thus, it should be observed that, given team size, a higher average
ability in the team is associated with a higher survival probability and, given
ability, a larger team size is associated with a lower survival probability. These
are the first two hypotheses tested in this paper.
Besides the effects of team size and ability, the O-ring theory further implies that
individuals segregate between firms according to their level of ability. In labour
market equilibrium this results in homogeneous workforces within firms. Observ-
ing inhomogeneous teams should therefore be a transitory phenomenon caused
by imperfect information about each others’ abilities. Hence, it is additionally
analysed how the degree of homogeneity with respect to team members’ ability in-
fluences the probability of firm survival. Finally, the fourth variable investigated
is the degree of heterogeneity in educations. This is motivated by the assumption
that for the different tasks knowledge from different fields is necessary.
For the analyses in this paper, I draw on register data covering the entire popu-
lation of firms founded in Denmark in 1998 as well as all individuals involved in
these new firms. This leaves me with a sample of more than 14,000 firms which
are distributed over all sectors of the economy. The data provide rich information
on the individuals so that it is possible to control for ability when estimating the
effect of size on survival and to determine the degree of homogeneity with respect
to ability as well as with respect to educations within firms.
The results show that both team size and ability have a positive effect on the
survival of young firms. Most important is founding in a team at all. In contrast,
the homogeneity with respect to ability and the heterogeneity with respect to
educations do not effect the probability of firm survival.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the hypotheses for the empirical
analysis are derived from the O-ring theory. In Section 3, the data are described.
Section 4 presents the estimation method and specification and Section 5 the
results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
The O-ring theory goes back to Kremer (1993) and applies to production pro-
cesses which consist of a series of tasks each of which must be performed at a
certain minimum level of quality for the output to have positive market value.
Individual ability corresponds to the probability that an individual performs her
task sufficiently well. The project as a whole only has a positive outcome if
all team members perform their tasks at a certain minimum level of quality.
Otherwise output is zero. This is modeled by including individual abilities mul-
tiplicatively in the production function
Y = F (k, n)
[
n∏
i=1
qi
]
n, (1)
where k refers to physical capital, n to the number of tasks and qi ∈ (0, 1) to the
probability that the individual assigned to task i works sufficiently well, which
is her ability. Following the literature, it is assumed that each task requires one
person, i.e. n is also the number of individuals.2 Following the exposition above,
[
∏n
i=1 qi] is the survival probability of the firm.
The survival probability exhibits the following two properties. First, given team
size, the survival rate increases in the ability level of each individual in the team
∂([
∏n
i=1 qi])
∂qi
=
∏
j 6=i
qj > 0, (2)
And second, given ability, the survival rate decreases in the size of the team3
∂([
∏n
i=1 qi])
∂n
= ln(q)qn < 0. (3)
One can argue that the effect of insufficient task performance on survival depends
on the phase of a firm’s life cycle. In the conception phase of the business idea the
product might have no market value at all if one of the involved team members
does not perform her task sufficiently well. Consequently, the firm might have
2In his seminal paper, Kremer (1993) explicitly mentions that n indicates the number of
tasks and not necessarily the number of employees. But his exposition of the theory uses the
assumption of one person per task and Fabel (2004b) follows him in this respect.
3In equilibrium these two effects are balanced and there is a unique failure probability for
optimally composed firms. It is even possible to give a value for this failure probability: 0.632.
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no basis anymore and therefore has to give up. In contrast, if the firm already
reached its operation phase, it is no longer inevitable that the firm dissolves if
someone makes a mistake. Low-level performance during contract fulfillment for
one client can be compensated by normal-level performance for another. The
firm can make a loss but this loss is not necessarily threatening for the whole
business. Nevertheless, the effects concerning ability level and team size on the
survival rate should also be observed in the operation phase of the firm, albeit
weaker. Formulated as empirical hypotheses, equation (2) and (3) yield:
H1a: Given team size, the probability of firm survival increases in the ability level
of the team members.
H1b: Given the ability level of the team members, the probability of firm survival
decreases in team size.
The assumption of the O-ring theory that team size is negatively related to firm
survival cannot easily be reconciled with the results already established in the
literature.4 The existing studies almost unanimously come to the conclusion that
size is positively related to survival. The positive relationship between size and
survival is sometimes even regarded as a stylized fact (Geroski (1995), Sutton
(1997), Caves (1998)). However, most of the papers cannot control for ability
due to data restrictions. Taking equation 2 and 3 together, it is possible that the
effect of size appears to be positive as in most of the previous empirical studies.
This is the case when higher able persons build larger teams. As shown by
Kremer (1993), the O-ring theory implies that ability and team size are positively
correlated. Thus, the positive effect of team size found empirically could result
because ability is not controlled for.
Team size also appears to be positively related to survival when human capital
variables such as length of education, educational degrees or labor market ex-
perience are included in the regressions (Bru¨derl et al. (1996), Prantl (2003),
and Jørgensen (2005)). However, human capital variables only capture part of
individuals’ ability and may not fully represent the q of the O-ring theory. The
4Evans (1987a,b), Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989),
Mata and Portugal (1994), Mata, Portugal, and Guimara˜es (1995), Audretsch and Mahmood
(1995), Bru¨derl, Preisendo¨rfer, and Ziegler (1996), Cabral and Mata (2003), Prantl (2003), and
Jørgensen (2005).
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theory itself suggests using wages as representation of ability. To see this, con-
sider a firm that maximizes expected profits and employs only individuals of one
ability level5
max
q,k,n
pi(q, k, n) = pF (k, n)qnn− w(q)n− rk (4)
For the following, a specific functional form for F (k, n) is needed. Normalising
output price p to one and specifying output per team member F (k, n) as kαn1−α
as in Fabel (2004b) the firm does not want to change the ability level of its workers
if
∂pi(q, k, n)
∂q
: kαn1−αqn−1n =
dw(q)
dq
, (5)
i.e. if marginal revenue of changing the ability level equals marginal costs. The
first order condition with respect to capital k is
∂pi(q, k, n)
∂k
: αkα−1n1−αqn = r. (6)
Solving equation 6 for k, inserting it into equation 5, and integration yields6
w(q) = (1− α)
(
α
r
) α
1−α
(n)
1
1−α q
n
1−α . (7)
This is a monotonously increasing function of ability, i.e. each ability level is
unambiguously reflected in a certain wage and a higher ability level comes along
with a higher wage. In the empirical analysis, wages are therefore used as a
measure of ability.
Besides insufficient ability, the O-ring theory implies a further reason why a firm
can fail: better outside options for at least one team member. These can arise
when teams are built with the wrong partners. In the production function (1),
the marginal product of ability of the individual assigned to task i is increasing
in the average ability levels of the individuals assigned to the other tasks
d2Y
dqid
(∏
j 6=i qj
) = F (k, n)n > 0. (8)
5As will be explained below, the O-ring theory actually implies the sorting of individuals
according to their ability which results in homogeneous workforces within firms.
6The constant of integration is zero since an individual with zero ability destroys the product
with certainty and therefore cannot receive positive wages.
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This means that skills are complementary.7 If labour markets are competitive,
this implies that firms which have started to employ individuals with the high-
est ability in the population (and still have suboptimal size) can attract other
individuals of the highest ability level since they can pay them the highest wage.
Firms with medium ability individuals cannot successfully compete for higher
able individuals but are successful in attracting medium ability individuals com-
pared to firms with lower average ability level. This leads to homogeneity in the
ability levels of all individuals within firms.
As a theory for describing an equilibrium, the O-ring theory implies that het-
erogenous teams are not formed at all since abilities are publicly observable and
heterogeneous teams are unattractive for high-ability individuals. Thus, in equi-
librium it is useless to search for an effect of the degree of homogeneity on firm
survival. But, as shown in Mu¨ller (2008), the ability levels of team members in
just established firms exhibit a considerable amount of heterogeneity although
not as much as in randomly assembled teams. It is possible that this is partly
due to measurement error, since ability always has to be approximated somehow.
But it might also be the case that abilities are not perfectly observable so that in-
dividuals mistakenly choose the wrong partners. Moreover, each individual might
only overlook a small set of potential partners. Thus, teams with similar but not
the same level of ability are built. If real abilities and suitable partners become
known over time only, better outside options for some team members can arise
and a firm can close down because of too much diversity in the abilities. Thus, a
further hypothesis is:
H2: Given average ability and team size, the probability of firm survival increases
in the degree of homogeneity with respect to the ability of the team members.
As mentioned above, in the literature on the O-ring theory it is assumed that
each task requires one person. This is a rather strong assumption as it rules out
the cases where one individual can perform several tasks and several individuals
are assigned to one task. Nevertheless, it can be expected that individuals are
predestined for certain tasks but not for others due to their field of education.
Presumably, a firm with a team consisting of individuals with different educa-
7This is the same concept of complementarity as applied e.g. in Milgrom and Roberts (1990,
1995) and to explain the joint occurrence of certain technologies.
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tional backgrounds can rely on a broader basis of knowledge and therefore has a
higher probability of survival. Hence, a third hypothesis is:
H3: Given average ability and team size, a high degree of heterogeneity in educa-
tions increases the probability of firm.
With H2 and H3 this paper is also related to the literature of the so called “up-
per echelons research” in business administration (Hambrick and Mason (1984)),
which analyses the impact of team composition on firm performance.8 However,
the focus of the upper echelons research lies mainly on well established and rather
big firms. Moreover, none of these studies looks at homogeneity in ability as it is
done in this paper and all papers that consider new firms are interested in other
outcome variables than survival.9
3 Data
The data used in this paper are provided by Statistics Denmark, Denmark’s
federal statistical office. These are register data, which cover the whole population
of firms which were set up in Denmark in 1998 and that were still in operation
at the end of that year.10 The total number of new firms at the end of 1998
amounts to 16,063. On an annual basis, these firms were observed until 2001 or
until they shut down.11 In the start-up year and at the end of each year during
the follow-up period, the current number of employees and the current amount
of exports, purchases, and sales are recorded. Additionally, industry of business,
legal form and location are registered in the start-up year.
8For overviews, see Carpenter et al., 2004, Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996 or Jackson, 1992.
9Roure and Madique (1986), Roure and Keeley (1990), Ensley, Carland, and Carland (1998),
Ensley and Amason (1999), Ensley and Amason (1999), Beckman, Burton, and O’Reilly (2007),
and Zimmerman (2008) look at new firms.
10Firms that started in 1998 and shut down within the same year are not contained in the
data set.
11The same procedure has been applied to all firms founded in 1994. However, for these
firms it is only possible to merge individual information for the person who registered the firm
with the authorities for the start-up year. Since it is essential for determining the degree of
homogeneity between team members to either have information on all individuals or to have at
least a representative sample of the individuals, the analysis is restricted to the 1998 cohort.
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Table 1: Survival and hazard rates
surviving firms number of exits survival rate hazard rate
1998 14,171 0 1.000 0
1999 11,822 2,349 0.834 0.166
2000 8,994 2,828 0.635 0.239
2001 7,369 1,625 0.520 0.181
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001, author’s calculations.
By a combination of firm and personal identification numbers (ID), it is possible
to link the firm-level information to information on individuals stored in the In-
tegrated Database for Labour Market Research (IDA). The IDA database covers
a wide range of variables on the total Danish population from 1980 onwards, in-
cluding the complete education and employment history. The latter can be used
to generate the relevant variables for the individuals involved in the new firms in
all years. Due to missing information about the employees for some firms 14,171
firms of the original 16,063 firms can be used for the subsequent analysis.
A drawback of the data is that it is not possible to identify the persons who
perform the necessary tasks in the firm. However, as the great majority of the
new firms are small entities, each person can be considered to be important. 12
In the following, firms with at least two persons involved are referred to as “team
foundations”.
In Table 1, the distribution of the life duration of the firms in the data set is
shown. At the end of the observation period in 2001, only about half of the firms
still exist. The largest number of exits occurs in the second year after foundation.
4 Empirical Approach
The effects of the variables relevant for this paper are determined by estimating
a duration model. In principle, the exit of a firm can occur at any time during
12Figure 1 in the appendix shows the average number of individuals per firm over the whole
period of consideration by industry. The total average firm size is 1.7 persons.
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the year, i.e. survival time is continuous. However, in the data at hand it is only
reported whether the respective firm still exists at the end of the year. Since
spell lengths are only observed in intervals, a model for interval censored data is
estimated. The relevant hazard rate is the probability of exit during year j given
survival up to year j − 1:
hj(X) = P (j − 1 < T ≤ j|T > j − 1, X), (9)
where j denotes the half-open interval (yearj−1 − yearj]. Duration models based
on this type of data can be estimated by applying methods for standard binary
outcome models (e.g. Sueyoshi (1995), Jenkins (2005)). The dependent variable
contains the information whether or not firm i survived year j
Sij =
 1 if firm i survives year j0 if firm i does not survive year j . (10)
The likelihood function is constructed as follows: The probability that firm i
survives year j is given by P (Sij = 1) = 1 − hij(Xij, β). Correspondingly, the
probability that firm i does not survive year j is given by P (Sij = 0) = hij(Xij, β).
Considering only one firm, the probability for the sequence of outcomes sik over
the whole period of observation amounts to
P (Si1 = si1, Si2 = si2, . . . , Sij = sij) =
j∏
k=1
(1− hik(Xij))sikhik(Xij)1−sik . (11)
Since this holds for all firms, the likelihood function for the whole sample is
L =
n∏
i=1
 j∏
k=1
(1− hik(Xij))sikhik(Xij))1−sik
 . (12)
Taking logs, the loglikelihood function is obtained
logL =
n∑
i=1
j∑
k=1
[sik log(1− hik(Xij))) + (1− sik) log(hik(Xij)))]. (13)
One observation is a firm-year combination and the probability of surviving the
following year is estimated.
To make the model estimable, a functional form for the hazard rate hik(Xij) must
be chosen. In principle, any continuous distribution function can be used. As it
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is known from practical applications of binary choice models, the results are not
very sensitive to the functional form of the distribution functions. Therefore, the
choice of the functional form for the hazard rate reduces to the question what
can be implemented easiest. For this paper, the logistic distribution is chosen
which turns equation (13) into a likelihood function of a pooled logit model. In
order to allow the hazard rate to vary with survival time (duration dependence)
year dummies are added to the list of regressors.
To account for firm heterogeneity which is not captured in the observable vari-
ables, a random effects logit is estimated. In this case the hazard rate becomes
hik =
exp(X ′iβ + ci)
1 + exp(X ′iβ + ci)
, (14)
where ci reflects the unobservable firm effect. In random effects models for bi-
nary variables it is assumed that this effect is sampled along with the dependent
variable and observable independent variables and it is removed by integrating it
out.13 Here, the distribution of ci is assumed to be N ∼ (0, σc) and the removal
of this effect is carried out with the default approximation routine implemented
in STATA’s xtlogit command.
Measurement and Specification
As mentioned in Section 2, wages are used to measure ability. Statistics Den-
mark provides the average hourly wage once per year for each year the individual
was wage employed. For the analyses in this paper, these wages are corrected
for inflation, disciplines, and industry effects. The goal of correcting the wages
this way is to exclude all components which do not represent ability.14 After the
correction, the average lifetime hourly wage of an individual is calculated, start-
ing with her year of labour market entry until 2001. Thus, for the estimations
in this paper, the ability level in a team is the average of the corrected lifetime
13For details, see e.g. Wooldridge (2002), pp. 482.
14The effects of disciplines and industries were corrected for to take out demand effects: If,
for example, engineers are in short supply, their wages rise due to the working of the market
forces and not due to an increase in their abilities in the first line . See Mu¨ller (2008) for further
discussion of the wage correcting procedure.
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wages across all team members. The degree of homogeneity of abilities is deter-
mined by calculating the standard deviation of the corrected lifetime wages. For
easier interpretation, the negative of the standard deviations is included in the
regressions.
As a measure of the degree of heterogeneity in education, the Herfindahl-Index of
the highest education attained is calculated for each team. The Herfindahl-Index
is a measure of concentration. For the purpose of this paper it is computed as
H =
n∑
i=1
s2i , (15)
where si denotes the share of education i in a team.
The range of possible values of the Herfindahl-Index depends on the number of
individuals in a team. To correct for this and to make the Herfindahl-Index
better comparable between teams of different size, the index is transformed to
the [0, 1]-interval in the following way
H tr = 1−
(
H − 1
n
)
n
n− 1 ∈ [0, 1]. (16)
As a result, it takes on the value zero if all individuals have the same educa-
tion and becomes one if each individual attained a different education. With
this transformation, teams in different firms are treated as equally diverse if all
individuals have different educations, independently of team size.
The variable the Herfindahl-Index is based on can take on more than 1,000 values,
i.e. it provides highly detailed information on the education of the individuals.
Since the educational degree is only a crude measure for the task actually fulfilled
in the firm, there is no obvious level of aggregation for this variable. In this
paper, the variable has not been aggregated in any respect for calculating the
Herfindahl-Index.
The empirical model is estimated in two different versions: In the first, only
characteristics of the start-up year are considered. This takes account of the
fact that the conditions at start have a lasting effect on the organisation and the
outcome of young firms (e.g. Mata and Portugal (1994) or Baron, Burton, and
Hannan (1996)). The second version allows the regressors to take on different
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values over time. The share of exports in sales and regional as well as industry
dummies are used as control variables. Since it is assumed that all relevant
observable and unobservable abilities of the individuals are reflected in the wages,
no further ability measures are included in the regressions. In order to to account
for the conjecture that the marginal effect of the first partner is different from the
marginal effect of a second or a third partner, a dummy which takes the value
one if at least two persons are involved in the firm is included in addition to the
variable “team size”.
Table 2 and Table 3 show descriptive statistics of the variables used in the re-
gressions in the next Section. The numbers are based on firm-year combinations.
Table 2 shows the figures for characteristics in the start-up year whereas in Ta-
ble 3 it is allowed that the variables change over time. Surviving firms exhibit
a higher average ability, but also have more employees than non-surviving firm.
And teams in surviving firms are less homogeneous with respect to ability and
less heterogeneous with respect to educations than in non-surviving firms.
5 Results
Table 4 shows the estimation results. The figures are the marginal effects calcu-
lated at the mean of the independent variables. For the estimations in columns
(1) and (2), only the values of the respective variables in the start-up year are
considered. Columns (3) and (4) show the results when the values of the vari-
ables are updated each year. As can be seen from the critical value of the LR-test
(χ¯201), the hypothesis that unobserved effects do not play a role can be rejected
for both versions of the empirical model. Therefore, only the results from the RE
logit are considered in the following.
Concerning the effect of ability and team size, it turns out that both the average
ability in a team and the size of the team have a positive impact on the survival
probability. Additionally, having a team at all has a much stronger effect on
survival than including a further person in a team. Considering only start-up
year characteristics, an increase of the average ability by one standard deviation
increases the probability of survival by 1 percentage point. An additional team
member yields a 0.5 percentage points higher survival rate but the first partner
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics - Start-up year characteristics
variable all firms surviving firms non-surviving firms
mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
avg. ability 3.731 0.325 3.735 0.321 3.714 0.340
team size 1.456 1.830 1.511 1.941 1.215 1.189
team (y/n) 0.133 0.340 0.147 0.355 0.069 0.253
homogeneity in abilities -0.036 0.113 -0.040 0.118 -0.019 0.087
heterogeneity in educations 0.115 0.308 0.127 0.321 0.061 0.232
share of exports in sales 0.020 0.123 0.022 0.126 0.015 0.108
copenhagen 0.429 0.495 0.422 0.494 0.459 0.498
city 0.299 0.458 0.297 0.457 0.306 0.461
rural 0.273 0.445 0.281 0.450 0.234 0.424
low-technology 0.020 0.141 0.022 0.148 0.011 0.106
medium-low technology 0.010 0.099 0.011 0.103 0.007 0.081
medium-high technology 0.002 0.049 0.002 0.049 0.002 0.047
high technology 0.135 0.342 0.146 0.353 0.089 0.284
construction 0.099 0.298 0.100 0.300 0.091 0.288
wholesale trade 0.034 0.180 0.035 0.183 0.030 0.169
retail trade 0.197 0.397 0.184 0.388 0.252 0.434
hotels, restaurants 0.062 0.242 0.057 0.232 0.084 0.278
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. 0.108 0.310 0.104 0.306 0.124 0.330
knowl.-intens. market serv. 0.199 0.399 0.202 0.402 0.183 0.387
other knowl.-intens. serv. 0.033 0.179 0.035 0.183 0.027 0.163
freight transport 0.101 0.301 0.101 0.302 0.100 0.300
number of observations 31,992 26,129 5,863
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001, author’s calculations.
increases the survival probability by 12 percentage points. Allowing for time
varying characteristics the effects remain roughly the same both regarding sign
and magnitude. H1a cannot be rejected but H1b can. Thus, I cannot find the
countervailing effect of team size and ability in the failure probability suggested
by the O-ring theory. Instead, I can corroborate the finding of earlier studies
stating that firms founded with a higher number of persons have higher survival
chances. Interestingly, this result appears even when ability is controlled for.
The effects of homogeneity in abilities and heterogeneity in educations can be
found in row three and four of Table 4. Obviously, the degree of homogeneity
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics - Time-varying characteristics
variable all firms surviving firms non-surviving firms
mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
avg. ability 3.724 0.322 3.727 0.319 3.713 0.337
team size 1.697 2.621 1.804 2.819 1.199 1.230
team (y/n) 0.178 0.382 0.204 0.403 0.055 0.227
homogeneity of ability -0.051 0.134 -0.059 0.142 -0.016 0.079
heterogeneity in educations 0.153 0.347 0.176 0.366 0.048 0.207
share of exports in sales 0.022 0.126 0.023 0.129 0.014 0.109
number of observations 31,895 26,273 5,622
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001, author’s calculations.
in abilities and the degree of heterogeneity do not have any effect of the survival
probability of young firms. This result casts doubt an the assumption that team
heterogeneity is an important variable to explain firm performance as put forward
in the upper echelons literature. These doubts concern at least new firms. What
is striking about the previous studies on new firms is that it is obviously difficult
to identify any effect of team heterogeneity at all. However, this could also be
a small number-problem as the authors of the previous studies rely on rather
few firms and selected industries. In contrast, the analysis in this paper uses a
high number of observations but also finds no effect. This suggests that team
heterogeneity is rather unimportant for firm performance.
A possible reason for the missing effect of team heterogeneity is that diversity
is a double-edged sword. Concerning ability, it is attractive for a high ability
individual to look for other high ability individuals because of their lower failure
probability. On the other hand, high ability individuals also demand a high
compensation for their labour input. Thus, if not all tasks are essential for
the success of the project − and it seems that they are not − it could simply
be cheaper to employ an individual with low ability. Concerning educations,
heterogeneity may provide a broader basis of knowledge. But on the other hand,
different educations also represents different modes to interpret the world what
could lead to misunderstandings and even to conflict among the team members.
Overall, the effects can cancel out.
With the results presented in Table 4, the O-ring theory does not describe the
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situation in young firms very well. However, one can argue that the theory only
applies to a subset of industries. Task complementarity might only be particular
for the production environments in certain sectors. However, this is not confirmed
in the data. To account for the probable limited applicability of the theory the
regressions are performed separately for different industries. This differentiation
does not lead to any results systematically different from those found for all firms.
However, as can be seen in Table 6 and Table 7 in the appendix, the main results
are driven by the firms in the service sectors.
Moreover, it might be the case that firms founded with university graduates
are better described by the O-ring theory than firms founded without university
graduates. The reason is that firms with university graduates are more likely
to deal with innovative products and therefore with more complex technologies
which require specialists in different fields. Good matching might therefore be
particularly important for these firms. However, as shown in Table 8 in the
appendix, regressions run for firms founded with university graduates only, again
do not lead to major differences compared to the effects for all firms. The only
deviation from the results for all firms is that for team with university graduates
it is only important to have a team at all. A further team member has no
additional effect. This again confirms the conjecture that the step from a single
entrepreneur to a team is the crucial step to increase the probability of survival.
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Table 4: Results (marginal effects)
dep. var.: survival of the following year (yes/no)
start-up year characteristics time-varying characteristics
pooled logit RE logit pooled logit RE logit
coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
avg. ability 0.031*** 0.006 0.033*** 0.007 0.028*** 0.006 0.030*** 0.007
team size 0.004** 0.002 0.005** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004*** 0.002
team (y/n) 0.114*** 0.017 0.118*** 0.017 0.149*** 0.014 0.118*** 0.015
homogeneity in abilities 0.015 0.041 0.016 0.044 -0.022 0.040 -0.021 0.034
heterogeneity in educations -0.022 0.030 -0.024 0.032 -0.007 0.031 -0.012 0.025
share of exports in sales 0.050** 0.021 0.052*** 0.021 0.047** 0.020 0.044** 0.019
regional dummies (ref.cat. copenhagen)
city 0.012** 0.005 0.013** 0.005 0.009* 0.005 0.011** 0.005
rural 0.038*** 0.005 0.041*** 0.006 0.036*** 0.005 0.039*** 0.005
industry dummies (ref.cat. low-technology)
medium-low technology 0.056*** 0.016 0.058*** 0.016 0.039** 0.017 0.038*** 0.014
medium-high technology 0.040* 0.022 0.043* 0.022 0.035* 0.021 0.036** 0.017
high technology -0.016 0.047 -0.015 0.053 -0.015 0.045 -0.005 0.052
construction 0.041*** 0.012 0.041*** 0.012 0.022* 0.012 0.021* 0.012
wholesale trade -0.011 0.014 -0.013 0.016 -0.014 0.014 -0.018 0.017
retail trade -0.074*** 0.015 -0.083*** 0.019 -0.074*** 0.015 -0.100*** 0.023
hotels, restaurants -0.130*** 0.020 -0.150*** 0.029 -0.155*** 0.021 -0.230*** 0.042
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. -0.034*** 0.015 -0.037** 0.017 -0.030** 0.014 -0.036** 0.019
knowl.-intens. market serv. 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.014 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.014
other knowl.-intens. serv. 0.026* 0.015 0.027* 0.016 0.031** 0.014 0.029** 0.013
freight transport -0.015 0.014 -0.016 0.016 -0.025* 0.014 -0.028 0.018
time dummies (ref.cat. 1999)
2000 -0.091*** 0.005 -0.111*** 0.018 -0.087*** 0.005 -0.173*** 0.014
2001 -0.044*** 0.006 -0.083** 0.035 -0.044*** 0.006 -0.232*** 0.036
pseudo-R2 0.036 0.057
log likelihood -14,686.789 -14,685.742 -14,005.661 -13,979.795
χ¯201 2.09* 51.73***
number of observations 31,992 31,992 31,895 31,895
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Marginal effects are calculated
at the means of the independent variables. For the calculation of the marginal effects of the RE logit, the
random effect is set to its mean value zero. For a detailed description of the combined industries see Table 5 in
the appendix.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyse how the survival of young firms is affected by the level of
ability, the team size, team members’ homogeneity with respect to ability, and
team members’ heterogeneity with respect to educations. The O-ring theory of
production served as a theoretical basis. It turns out that the average level of
ability in a team and the team size have positive effects on a firms’ probability
to survive the next year. Most important is having a team at all. In contrast,
homogeneity with respect to ability and heterogeneity with respect to educations
do not have any on the probability of survival. The results of this paper imply
that young firms can be supported in their longevity by making sure that several
persons are involved and the ability of the persons is as high as possible. However,
the degree of diversity in ability and educations can be neglected.
With respect to the O-ring theory, the result that more persons are good for
survival even when ability, measured by wages, is controlled for, implies that
the O-ring theory does not adequately describe the project “firm foundation”.
The reason is that the positive effect of team size contradicts the fundamental
assumption of the O-ring theory that a further person in a team also constitutes
a further risk.
Presumably, the main reason why the O-ring theory is not a good description
of young firms is that it does not allow for redundancies. One good worker
cannot be substituted by two mediocre workers in the theory. This is an extreme
assumption. If tasks are really critical, it might be worthwhile to back up these
tasks with a second person who checks the work of the first. A second reason for
the inapplicability of the theory is that it probably is always possible to absorb
mistakes in the course of the project at least to some extent.
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Appendix
Table 5: Definition of Industries
NACE - Code Description
Low-technology 15, 16 Food, beverages and tobacco
17, 18, 19 Textile and clothing
20, 21, 22 Wood, pulp, paper products, printing and publish-
ing
36, 37 Other manufacturing and recycling
Medium-low technology 23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products
351 Shipbuilding
Medium-high technology 24, excl. 24.4 Chemicals excl. pharmaceuticals
29 Non-electrical machinery
31 Electric machinery
34 Motor vehicles
352, 354, 355 Other transport equipment
High-technology 244 Pharmaceuticals
30 Computers, office machinery
32 Electronics, communication
33 Scientific instruments
353 Aerospace
Knowledge-intensive 64 Post and telecommunications
high-tech services 72 Computer and related activities
73 Research and development
Knowledge-intensive 61 Water transport
market services (excl. 62 Air transport
financial inter- 70 Real estate activities
mediation) 71 Renting of machinery and equipment w/o opera-
tor, and of personal and household goods
74 Other business activities
Other knowledge- 80 Education
intensive services 85 Health and social work
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
Source: OECD (2003).
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Figure 1: Average number of employees during the period 1998 and 2001
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Reading aid: Firms in the knowledge-intensive market services have on average 1.50 individuals during the
period 1998 to 2001.
A * at the sector names indicates whether firms with university graduates differ significantly from firms without
university graduates at the 5% level. For a detailed description of the combined industries, see Table 5.
Source: Statistics Denmark, own calculations.
Table 6: Results (marginal effects) for firms founded in the manufacturing sector
dep. var.: survival of the following year (yes/no)
start-up year characteristics time-varying characteristics
pooled logit RE logit pooled logit RE logit
coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
avg. ability 0.035 0.024 0.004* 0.003 0.023 0.023 0.014 0.012
team size 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001
team (y/n) -0.059 0.078 -0.003 0.012 0.169*** 0.064 0.061* 0.034
homogeneity in abilities -0.095 0.119 -0.010 0.012 0.076 0.128 0.027 0.048
heterogeneity in educations 0.092 0.063 0.007 0.008 -0.126 0.149 -0.047 0.041
share of exports in sales 0.040 0.072 0.003 0.005 0.040 0.060 0.019 0.025
regional dummies (ref.cat. copenhagen)
city 0.020 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.016 0.007 0.008
rural 0.035** 0.016 0.003* 0.002 0.026* 0.016 0.014 0.009
industry dummies (ref.cat. low-technology)
medium-low technology 0.048*** 0.015 0.004** 0.002 0.034** 0.015 0.015* 0.009
medium-high technology 0.032* 0.018 0.002* 0.001 0.029* 0.017 0.012 0.008
high technology -0.014 0.038 -0.001 0.005 -0.008 0.035 0.000 0.017
time dummies (ref.cat. 1999)
2000 -0.106*** 0.021 -0.049*** 0.014 -0.095*** 0.020 -0.095*** 0.022
2001 -0.078*** 0.023 -0.180*** 0.045 -0.075*** 0.022 -0.180*** 0.038
pseudo-R2 0.040 0.049
log likelihood -814.614 -811.340 -783.096 -778.218
χ¯201 6.55*** 9.76***
number of observations 2,124 2,124 2,131 2,131
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Marginal effects are calculated
at the means of the independent variables. For the calculation of the marginal effects of the RE logit, the
random effect is set to its mean value zero. For a detailed description of the combined industries see Table 5.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
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Table 7: Results (marginal effects) for firms founded in the service sectors
dep. var.: survival of the following year (yes/no)
start-up year characteristics time-varying characteristics
pooled logit RE logit pooled logit RE logit
coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
avg. ability 0.036*** 0.007 0.039*** 0.009 0.032*** 0.007 0.038*** 0.009
team size 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003
team (y/n) 0.130*** 0.021 0.138*** 0.021 0.134*** 0.020 0.121*** 0.016
homogeneity in abilities 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.054 -0.035 0.048 -0.034 0.045
heterogeneity in educations -0.009 0.040 -0.011 0.043 0.046 0.038 0.034 0.034
share of exports in sales 0.065*** 0.023 0.072*** 0.025 0.064*** 0.023 0.068*** 0.024
regional dummies (ref.cat. copenhagen)
city 0.011** 0.006 0.013** 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.013* 0.007
rural 0.040*** 0.006 0.044*** 0.007 0.038*** 0.006 0.045*** 0.006
industry dummies (ref.cat. retail trade)
wholesale trade 0.054*** 0.007 0.060*** 0.009 0.051*** 0.007 0.056*** 0.007
hotels, restaurants -0.048*** 0.011 -0.056*** 0.015 -0.067*** 0.011 -0.083*** 0.018
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. 0.035*** 0.007 0.041*** 0.009 0.038*** 0.007 0.046*** 0.007
knowl.-intens. market serv. 0.069*** 0.006 0.076*** 0.008 0.072*** 0.006 0.079*** 0.007
other knowl.-intens. serv. 0.084*** 0.009 0.090*** 0.010 0.085*** 0.008 0.081*** 0.009
freight transport 0.052*** 0.007 0.059*** 0.009 0.043*** 0.007 0.050*** 0.007
time dummies (ref.cat. 1999)
2000 -0.100*** 0.006 -0.130*** 0.026 -0.095*** 0.006 -0.199*** 0.023
2001 -0.045*** 0.007 -0.103** 0.049 -0.043*** 0.007 -0.253*** 0.053
pseudo-R2 0.032 0.054
log likelihood -12,297.512 -12,296.266 -11,705.559 -11,688.144
χ¯201 2.49* 34.83***
number of observations 25,543 25,543 25,434 25,434
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Marginal effects are calculated
at the means of the independent variables. For the calculation of the marginal effects of the RE logit, the
random effect is set to its mean value zero. For a detailed description of the combined industries see Table 5.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
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Table 8: Results (marginal effects) for firms founded with university graduates
dep. var.: survival of the following year (yes/no)
start-up year characteristics time-varying characteristics
pooled logit RE logit pooled logit RE logit
coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
avg. ability 0.056*** 0.015 0.056*** 0.015 0.049*** 0.015 0.052*** 0.016
team size 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
team (y/n) 0.158*** 0.054 0.158*** 0.045 0.126*** 0.046 0.111*** 0.037
homogeneity in abilities 0.088 0.085 0.088 0.098 0.028 0.102 0.014 0.092
heterogeneity in educations -0.037 0.136 -0.037 0.117 0.048 0.097 0.039 0.081
share of exports in sales 0.050 0.035 0.050 0.034 0.043 0.032 0.042 0.031
regional dummies (ref.cat. copenhagen)
city 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.011
rural 0.034*** 0.013 0.034*** 0.012 0.032*** 0.012 0.031*** 0.012
industry dummies (ref.cat. low-technology)
medium-low technology -0.007 0.068 -0.007 0.068 -0.026 0.069 -0.033 0.085
medium-high technology -0.070 0.082 -0.070 0.096 -0.078 0.079 -0.063 0.117
high technology -0.215*** 0.079 -0.215* 0.125 -0.234*** 0.070 -0.267 0.206
construction -0.046 0.043 -0.046 0.043 -0.046 0.042 -0.058 0.055
wholesale trade -0.013 0.033 -0.013 0.033 -0.019 0.031 -0.021 0.037
retail trade -0.041 0.031 -0.041 0.031 -0.034 0.029 -0.043 0.037
hotels, restaurants -0.161*** 0.055 -0.161*** 0.057 -0.175*** 0.056 -0.223** 0.095
knowl.-intens. high-tech serv. -0.023 0.028 -0.023 0.029 -0.014 0.027 -0.013 0.031
knowl.-intens. market serv. -0.009 0.025 -0.009 0.026 -0.006 0.024 -0.010 0.027
other knowl.-intens. serv. -0.023 0.035 -0.023 0.035 -0.012 0.032 -0.017 0.038
freight transport -0.037 0.047 -0.037 0.045 -0.055 0.048 -0.077 0.065
time dummies (ref.cat. 1999)
2000 -0.095*** 0.013 -0.095*** 0.013 -0.078*** 0.012 -0.123*** 0.033
2001 -0.071*** 0.014 -0.071*** 0.014 -0.058*** 0.013 -0.160** 0.078
pseudo-R2 0.038 0.048
log likelihood -2,614.543 -2,614.543 -2,484.622 -2,483.193
χ¯201 0.00 2,86**
number of observations 5,844 5,844 5,825 5,825
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Marginal effects are calculated
at the means of the independent variables. For the calculation of the marginal effects of the RE logit, the
random effect is set to its mean value zero. For a detailed description of the combined industries see Table 5.
Source: Statistics Denmark, author’s calculations.
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